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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BRINE RECOVERY: HAS EIKE v. AMOCO
ENDED THE CONFUSION IN OKLAHOMA?*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this era of resource shortages and conservation, what was once
merely waste for disposal is now being examined for possible value. It
has become economically feasible to extract minerals found in brine
and drilling waste, and some companies are eager to explore opportu-
nities to do so. Technological advances have made it profitable to ex-
tract iodine, manganese, sodium, potassium, and other minerals from
the brine water of sludge pits and the salt water in underground reser-
voirs.' Brine has been put to use in waterflood operations to increase
oil production.2 There is also interest in desalinization of brine to sup-
plement water needs of cities and agriculture.3
There are currently few legal guidelines concerning brine recov-
ery. Confusion surrounds even basic considerations such as whether
brine is a mineral and whether it is part of the surface estate or the
mineral estate. In November 1980, the Oklahoma Supreme Court at-
tempted to clarify these issues in the controversial opinion of Eke v.
Amoco Production Co. (Eike I).4 However, two years later, the
* The author wishes to express her appreciation for the gracious assistance of Craig A.
Stokes and Charles A. Grissom, Jr. in preparing this Recent Development.
1. Case law provides examples of mineral extraction from brine. See, e.g., Eike v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 51 OKLA B.J. 2686 (Nov. 12, 1980) (extraction of iodine); Deseret Livestock Co. v.
State, 110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d 401 (1946) (extraction of salt); see also Davison, Determination of
Ifhether a Mineral is Locatable or Leaseable, 21 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 565, 582-83 (1975)
(commercial brine operations produced sodium and potassium compounds).
2. See Holt v. Southwest Antioch Sand Unit, Fifth Enlarged, 292 P.2d 998, 999 (Okla. 1955)
(large quantities of salt water were forced into the producing oil pool, thus increasing production
of oil and gas through repressuring processes); Ambassador Oil Corp. v. Robertson, 384 S.W.2d
752, 754, 758 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (salt water was used for water flooding operations within the
unit).
3. Desalinization plants remove salt and chemicals from brine water providing pure water
for use by cities and for irrigation of farm land. See Hudson, Salt Water is a Mineral, Ownership
of a Natural Resource of Increasing importance in Oil-Producing States, 50 TEx. L. Rev. 448, 448
(1972).
4. Eike v. Amoco Prod. Co., 51 OKLA. B.J. 2686 (Nov. 12, 1980) [hereinafter cited asEike I],
rev'g No. C-76-286, slip op. (Okla. Dist. Ct. Woodward Cty. June 21, 1978), withdrawn, 53 OKLA.
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Oklahoma Supreme Court granted a petition for rehearing and, in Eike
v. Amoco Production Co. (Eike HJ),5 withdrew the Eike I opinion and
affirmed the trial court's decision.6  That lower court's opinion con-
tained fact findings and legal holdings which directly contradicted Eike
I. The ramifications of the court's vacillation between Eike I and Eike
II are far-reaching and have only served to compound the confusion.
This Recent Development will examine the problems created and the
questions left unanswered by the Eike decisions. These uncertainties
include the issues of brine ownership and its status as a mineral, as well
as the ancillary issues of trespass, capture, and royalty payments.
II. THE EKE DECISIONS
A. Statement of the Case
Amoco Production Company (Amoco) had acquired brine water
leases from surface owners over a 4766-acre tract known as Woodward
Trench.7 Some of the acreage in the Woodward Trench area had al-
ready been leased for oil and gas development by several companies,
including Sabine Production Company (Sabine), Texas Oil and Gas
Company (Texas), and Colonial Royalties Company (Colonial).'
Amoco produced the brine by water flood methods, piped it to a plant
where iodine was extracted, and returned the residue to the same for-
mation through injection wells.9 Although this area had previously
been unsuccessfully explored for oil and gas, Amoco began finding gas
in the brine, both in solution form and in free form. Amoco used some
of the gas to operate the iodine extraction plant, flared some, and sold
the rest to a pipeline company.' 0 As the amount of gas in the brine
increased, Amoco began including the right to solution gas in its brine
leases and obtained separate oil and gas leases over much of Wood-
B.J. 2602 (Oct. 21, 1982) (The District Court's decision was subsequently affirmed by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Eike v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 52,511 (Okla. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 8,
1983) (disposition noted at 54 OKLA. B.J. 414 (1983)).
5. Eike v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 52,511 (Okla. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 8, 1983) (mem., per
curiam) (disposition noted at 54 OKLA. B.J. 414 (1983)) [hereinafter cited as Eike 11]. The Eike II
opinion included the district court's "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," designated as
"Exhibit A," and the district court's "Journal Entry [of Judgment]," designated as "Exhibit B."
Thus, all further discussion pertaining to Eike II will deal with the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law, which were found by the Oklahoma Supreme Court to be "supported by
competent evidence and ... not contrary to law." Id. at 1-2.
6. Id.
7. Eike I, supra note 4, at 2686.
8. Id. at 2688.
9. Id. at 2686.
10. Id. at 2687.
1983]
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ward Trench."
In those situations where Amoco was producing gas from brine
wells under surface leases on acreage leased for oil and gas develop-
ment by Texas, Sabine, and Colonial, those companies contended that
they had a right to Amoco's gas. 12 They argued that Amoco's leases
did not grant the right to produce natural gas through a brine water
well. 3 These companies also alleged that Amoco was a trespasser and
bad faith converter of their property.' 4 Amoco maintained that its re-
covery of gas was unexpected and in good faith. The large amounts of
gas eventually discovered had not been anticipated' 5 and Amoco had
never attempted to conceal the extent of its gas discoveries.'
6
B. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's Initial Decision-Eike I
The Oklahoma Supreme Court initially considered the Eike con-
troversy in November of 1980. The court noted that "[o]wnership of
brine water has never been established in Oklahoma,"' 7 possibly be-
cause it had never been considered to be of value. Various approaches
were used to reach the determination that "brine water and its compo-
nents is a mineral,"' 8 thus belonging to the mineral estate owner.' 9
I1. Id.
12. Id. at 2688.
13. Id. Texas, Sabine, and Colonial used the analogy that a gas producer was not entitled to
casinghead gas when the lease specified only gas to support their argument that Amoco was not
entitled to gas when its leases specified brine water. "Amoco's leases include the phrase 'gas well'
as the method of producing the gas and to Texas, Sabine and Colonial a brine well is not a gas
well. We must disagree." Id. The Elike I court determined that any well that produced gas was a
"gas well" for lease purposes. Id.
14. Id. at 2689.
15. Id. Amoco expected the iodine project to produce $8 million worth of natural gas. .d. at
2687.
16. Id. at 2689.
17. Id. at 2687.
18. Id. at 2688. The court applied Kuntz' "manner of enjoyment" theory as well as the doc-
trine of ejusdem generir. Id. The manner of enjoyment theory holds that fresh water should
belong to the surface estate since it is necessary for the enjoyment of that estate. Salt water should
belong to the mineral estate because it serves no useful purpose to the surface estate. See I E.
KuNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 13.3, at 305-06 (1962).
Ejusdem generis is a rule of construction that limits the meaning of general words that follow
enumerations of specific terms. The general words will be construed as being of the same kind or
class as the things previously specified. See id. at 304. The Eike I court used this rule to include
brine water within the general words "and other minerals" following the specific terms "oil and
gas." See Eike I, supra note 4, at 2688.
The court also relied on authority from Arkansas and Texas in reaching its decision. Id. at
2687. Arkansas declared statutorily that salt water is a mineral. "The word 'mineral' as used
herein shall include oil, gas, asphalt, coal, iron, zinc, lead, cinnabar, bauxite, and salt water whose
naturally dissolved components (solutes) are used as a source of raw materials for bromine and
other products derived therefrom in bromine production." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 52-201 (Supp.
3
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Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
decision, it agreed that Sabine, Texas, and Colonial had no right to the
gas and gas proceeds from Amoco's brine wells.2" The court noted that
an oil and gas lease in Oklahoma historically has not been considered a
grant of possessory ownership of the minerals.2 Rather, a lease merely
conveys the right to drill and capture the minerals, and only when cap-
tured do the minerals become the property of the lessee.22 The court
reasoned that since Sabine, Texas, and Colonial had not been pre-
vented from drilling their own wells, they should not be entitled to gas
produced by Amoco under its lease.23 Regarding the alleged trespass,
the court agreed with the trial court that Amoco was a trespasser,24 but
held that Amoco was allowed to deduct production costs because of its
good faith.25  Finally, addressing the conversion allegation, the
Oklahoma court held that conversion had in fact occurred in certain
1981). The Eike I court also relied on the Texas decision of Ambassador Oil Corp. v. Robertson,
384 S.W.2d 752, 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). However, that decision appears to be based on little
authority. For a discussion of this decision, see Hudson, supra note 3, at 448 n.1.
19. Eike I, supra note 4, at 2688.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. In Wright v. Carter Oil Co., 97 Okla. 46, 223 P. 835 (1923), the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held:
[O]il and gas belong to the owner of the land and are a part of it so long as they are on it
or in it, or subject to his control; but when they escape and go into other land, or come
under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone. In other words, property
in the oil and gas does not become absolute until they are reduced to actual possession
by being brought to the surface and then controlled. . . . The right to reduce oil or gas
to possession is a valuable property right.
Id. at 47, 223 P. at 836. This is what is meant by "capture"--title by actual possession and control.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also applied this concept to salt water in West Edmond Salt Water
Disposal Ass'n v. Rosecrans, 204 Okla. 9, 14, 226 P.2d 965, 970 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S.
924 (1951):
In this respect water resembles oil, gas, or any other mineral fluid in nature, or of such
character that by a well drilled on one tract of land it may be drawn from adjoining
lands and become the property of the owner of the well when reduced to his possession.
Id.
23. Eike I, supra note 4, at 2688. Sabine, Texas, and Colonial were found to be entitled to a
lessee's interest in gas produced by Amoco's brine water wells on those tracts on which they held
valid leases. Id.
24. Id. at 2689. Amoco did not attempt to conceal the large gas discoveries. It also sought
gas leases from mineral owners and added a gas clause to later brine water leases. Although
Amoco did trespass on the brine water holdings when its leases had been obtained only from
surface owners, this brine trespass was held to be in good faith because of the uncertainty of brine
ownership under Oklahoma law at that time. Id.
25. Id. The distinction between a good faith trespasser and a bad faith trespasser is that the
former may deduct his cost of production whereas the latter may not. In Oklahoma, it is neces-
sary to prove some element of fraud, malice, oppression, evil intent, or gross negligence in order to
prove that a trespasser has acted in bad faith. See Edwards v. Lachman, 534 P.2d 670, 673 (Okla.
1974); Dilworth v. Fortier, 405 P.2d 38, 45 (Okla. 1964); Sapulpa Petroleum Co. v. McCray, 136
Okla. 269, 270, 277 P. 589, 590 (1929).
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 4, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss4/7
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
instances,26 and reversed the trial court's decision. 27
C. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's Second Decision-Eike II
In October 1982, the Oklahoma Supreme Court withdrew Eike I
and granted a rehearing. After examination of the record, transcript,
and briefs and after hearing oral argument, the court issued a memo-
randum opinion affirming the trial court's decision.28  The supreme
court held that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
were "supported by competent evidence and are not contrary to law."29
Despite their opposite results, Eike I and Eike II did agree that
Amoco was a good faith trespasser as to the gas recovered from the
brine3 0 and was entitled to recover gas production costs. 31 Moreover,
the decisions also agreed that the gas and gas proceeds from Amoco's
brine wells should be divided between Amoco and the mineral own-
ers,32 but that other parties with oil and gas leases in the reservoir area,
such as Sabine, Texas, and Colonial, were not entitled to share in the
proceeds.33
As discussed in the following section, the crucial differences
between Eke I and Eike II lie in their respective resolutions of the two
major issues: 1) whether brine is a mineral and 2) whether brine is part
of the surface estate. Eike II held that brine water is owned by the
surface owner; therefore, mineral deeds which convey "oil, gas and
other minerals" do not convey an interest in brine, except for the
amount necessary for oil and gas extraction.34 In addition, the court
determined that the surface estate includes iodine released from rocks
26. Eike 1, supra note 4, at 2690. Amoco was held accountable for any gas it used in its plant
and for any gas flared. This ruling only applied to those areas of the Woodward Trench that
Amoco did not have leased and for gas it used prior to obtaining gas leases. Id. at 2689.
27. Id. at 2690. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed and remanded the trial court's deci-
sion with instructions to grant the statutorily approved interest rate from the date of conversion.
Id.
28. Eike I, supra note 5, at 2.
29. Id. at 1-2.
30. See Eike 11 supra note 5, exhibit A, at 6; Eike I, supra note 4, at 2689. In Sapulpa
Petroleum Co. v. McCray, 136 Okla. 269, 277 P. 589 (1929), the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted,
"The fact that a purchaser may err in judgment is not enough to impeach his good faith, but it
exists where the purchase is made with an honest purpose, though the real title is not acquired."
Id. at 269, 277 P. at 590; see Dilworth v. Fortier, 405 P.2d 38, 46 (Okla. 1964).
31. Eike II, supra note 5, exhibit A, at 6; Eike I, supra note 4, at 2689; see s1pra note 25.
32. Eike I1, supra note 5, exhibit A, at 5; Eike 1, supra note 4, at 2688. Gas proceeds would
be distributed on a pro rata basis according to the acreage held by each of the lessees.
33. Eike I, supra note 5, exhibit A, at 5; Eike I, supra note 4, at 2688. The court applied the
rule of capture to preclude recovery. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
34. Eike II, supra note 5, exhibit A, at 5.
[Vol. 18:698
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by brine water,35 and thus a conveyance of "oil, gas and other miner-
als" does not convey an interest in iodine.36 Consequently, Eike II
found that Amoco's brine water leases, obtained from the surface own-
ers, conveyed the right to produce brine water and extract iodine and
other constituents. 37 Therefore, Amoco was not a trespasser as to the
brine water.38
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF EKE I AND EKE II ON
THE LEGAL STATUS OF BRINE
A. Is Brine a Mineral?
The controversy begins with the initial determination of whether
brine is a mineral.39 In Eike I, the Oklahoma Supreme Court deter-
mined brine to be a mineral;4° two years later, the court withdrew this
decision and determined that brine was not a mineral.4 The determi-
nation of whether a given substance is a mineral presents questions of
both fact and policy which vary greatly with jurisdiction and circum-
stances4 2 The scientific or technical definition of the term "mineral" is
"so broad as to embrace not only metallic minerals, oil, gas, stone,
sand, gravel and many other substances, but even the soil itself.143 It is
rare, however, that "mineral" is intended in the scientific sense when
used in ordinary transactions.4 The scientific definition is certainly too
expansive to be of practical use and the law has made the term "min-
eral" more workable by limiting the meaning. In Horse Creek Land &
Mining Co. v. Midkff,45 "mineral" was limited by defining it as includ-
ing "every inorganic substance which can be extracted from the earth
35. Id. It is unclear whether the court was attempting to distinguish between an element and
a mineral by classifying iodine as a "chemical element.'
36. Id.
37. Id., exhibit B, at 3.
38. Id., exhibit A, at 5.
39. A recent article discussed the brine ownership issue raised in Eike I, emphasizing the
issue of whether brine was a mineral. See Snyder, Salt Water Ownership, 53 OKLA. B.J. 1006
(1982).
40. Eike I, supra note 4, at 2686.
41. Eike II, supra note 5, exhibit A, at 5.
42. Fleming Found. v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 851 (rex. Civ. App. 1960) ("whether a
given substance is or is not a mineral within the meaning of the deeds in which the reservations
are made is a question of fact to be decided according to the circumstances"); see Comment,
Ownership of Unspecfed Minerals in Texas and Oklahoma After Reed v. Wylie II, 16 TULSA L.J.
511, 511 n.3 (1981).
43. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 527, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949).
44. Id.
45. 81 W. Va. 616, 95 S.E. 26 (1918).
1983]
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for profit, whether it be solid, . .. liquid, . ..or gaseous.'46 Al-
though the Horse Creek court narrowed the definition of "mineral,"
that definition was still so expansive as to include "salt and other min-
eral waters. 47
A second way of limiting the term "mineral" was introduced in
1960 by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals which held that "mineral
rights are to be interpreted according to their ordinary and natural
meaning where there is no manifestation of an intention expressed in
the deed to use them in a scientific or technical sense."48 This proposi-
tion has also gained acceptance in Oklahoma.49 The ordinary and nat-
ural meaning of "mineral" can vary considerably. Some courts go so
far as to consider brine and all other waters to be minerals; 50 however,
other courts suggest that all water should be excluded from the mineral
classification. 1 Various tests have been used to determine whether
water is a mineral. One test distinguishes surface water from ground-
water,5u while another test finds that the appropriate distinction is be-
tween fresh water and salt water. 3
46. Id. at 618, 95 S.E. at 27. The West Virginia court qualified its broad definition of "min-
eral" by stating that the definition would be used "unless there are words qualifying or limiting its
meaning, or unless from the deed, read and construed as a whole, it appears that the intention was
to give the word a more limited application." Id. This qualification has been applied in Texas
and Oklahoma where mineral rights are interpreted according to their ordinary meaning when no
intention is expressed to use them in a technical or scientific sense. See Holland v. Dolese Co., 540
P.2d 549, 550 (Okla. 1975); Fleming Found. v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 851-52 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960).
47. 81 W. Va. 616, 618, 95 S.E. 26, 27 (1918).
48. Fleming Found. v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Civ, App. 1960) (citing
Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949)).
49. "'Mineral rights are to be interpreted according to their ordinary and natural meaning
where there is no manifestation of an intention expressed in the deed to use them in a scientific or
technical sense.'" Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549, 550 (Okla. 1975) (quoting Mack Oil Co.
v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955, 961 (Okla. 1964)).
50. Gulf Prod. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 139 Tex. 183, -, 132 $.W.2d 553, 565 (1939). In
finding that an easement to take water constituted an encumbrance, the court deemed water to be
a mineral. Id.
51. Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 67, 141 P.2d 276, 280 (1943). "While it may be conceded
that water, in a technical sense, is a mineral, it does not follow that it will pass under ordinary
mineral deeds. . . ." Id.
52. Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 194 N.Y. 326, 338, 87 N.E. 504, 508 (1909)
("[Slubterranean waters have always been treated as a mineral in the decisions relating to their use
and enjoyment .. "). Contra Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex.
1973) ("[W]ater is part of the surface estate according to the ordinary and normal use of the words
conveying or reserving minerals.").
53. Ambassador Oil Corp. v. Robertson, 384 S.W.2d 752, 763 (rex. Civ. App. 1964) ("[S]alt
water is a mineral within the meaning of the phrase 'oil, gas and other minerals.' "). Contra
Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (rex. 1973) ("[TJhe water itself is an
incident of surface ownership in the absence of specific conveyancing language to the contrary.
And in our case the saline content has no consequence upon ownership.").
7
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A third and perhaps more practical way of determining whether a
substance is a mineral was set forth by the Supreme Court of Utah in
Deseret Livestock Co. v. State.54 In Deseret, the Utah court defined
"mineral" as "any natural substance having sufficient value to be
mined, quarried, or extracted for its own sake or its own specific use." '5
Several Oklahoma cases have applied a similar theory requiring that a
substance be exceptional in order to be considered a mineral for pur-
poses of a mineral conveyance 6.5  The Texas Supreme Court has also
adopted this approach in Heinatz v. Allen 5 7 and there stated the circum-
stances under which a substance would be considered a mineral. The
Heinatz court illustrated the exceptional substance theory with the ex-
ample of sand of value for glassmaking and limestone of such quality
that it could be profitably manufactured into cement.5 8 Such sub-
stances, when useful only for building and roadmaking, were not re-
garded as minerals in the ordinary meaning of the word. 9 If brine is to
be considered a mineral under this theory, it must possess a peculiar
property giving it special or exceptional value.
It is not clear which of the preceding tests was used by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Eike J.60 The court stated, "[W]e hereby
hold that brine water and its components is a mineral within the phrase,
'... oil, gas and other minerals,' and as such belongs to the mineral
estate owner .... ,,61 This suggested that the minerals in solution in
the brine may in fact give the brine its exceptional value. However, the
court did not consider brine water and its components separately, but
as one substance. This may have been based on the inability to sepa-
rate the components or minerals from the brine at the well-site.62
54. 110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d 401 (1946).
55. Id. at -, 171 P.2d at 403 (quoting 36 AM. Jua. Mines and Minerals § 4 (1941)).
56. In Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955 (Okla. 1964), the court set forth the excep-
tional substance theory by stating:
[D]etermination of whether exceptional substances are to be considered as minerals in a
particular case, must turn upon what the word denoting the substance ordinarily is un-
derstood to mean in the meaning and intention (vernacular) of the particular industry,
the commercial world and the landowners themselves at the time of the conveyance.
Id. at 961; accord Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549, 550 (Okla. 1975); Fleming Found. v.
Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 ('ex. Civ. App. 1960); see Snyder, supra note 40, at 1009.
57. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
58. Id. at 527, 217 S.W.2d at 997.
59. Id.
60. Eike I, supra note 4, at 2688.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d 704,715 (10th Cir. 1971). The court
held that absent specific reservations, a grant of gas by lease covered all components of the gas,
including helium. The gas was produced as a whole because wellhead separation of helium was
1983]
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B. Who Owns Brine?
In Eike II, the court avoided the mineral classification issue and
instead focused on the ownership issue.63 The court found that "the
brine water and iodine contained therein is owned by the surface own-
ers."'  In Oklahoma and other states where the courts often avoid the
issue of minerality, the issue of ownership becomes crucial. In deter-
mining whether a particular substance is included within the terms of a
lease which grants or reserves "other minerals," the difficulty lies in
attempting to determine the original parties' intention as to that sub-
stance.65 There are several tests and doctrines used by the courts in
dealing with such problems of construction.
The language of a contract as a whole governs its interpretation
and the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the writing
itself, if possible. 66 However, where the intention cannot be deter-
mined from the document, Oklahoma courts have historically relied
upon the doctrine of ejusdem generis to limit the substances included in
the mineral estate to those of the same general nature as the enumer-
ated substances. 67  Professor Kuntz explained this doctrine, stating,
"[W]here specific minerals are enumerated along with a general min-
eral grant or reservation, the court may conclude that the parties had in
mind only those minerals which have characteristics in common with
impractical. Id. at 714. This court's treatment of helium can be applied to brine in Eike since
iodine extraction could not take place at the well-site.
63. See Eike II, supra note 5, exhibit A, at 5. The Oklahoma Supreme Court also avoided
the mineral classification issue in Holt v. Southwest Antioch Sand Unit, Fifth Enlarged, 292 P.2d
998 (Okla. 1956). TheHol court allowed the mineral owner use of the salt water as needed in the
repressuring process for mining and removal of minerals. Id. at 1000. This appears to indicate
that the Oklahoma Supreme Court is basing minerality on the intended use and commercial value
of the brine. If so, for brine water to be considered a mineral, it must contain valuable compo-
nents that set it apart from brine which has no components worth extracting.
64. Eike II, supra note 5, exhibit A, at 5.
65. 1 E. KUNTZ, supra note 18, § 13.3, at 305.
66. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 157 (1981) requires taking the contract as a whole to give effect to
every part and using each clause to help interpret the others. Id. § 155 is the related rule of
interpretation that the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possi-
ble. See Panhandle Coop. Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108, 113 (Okla. 1971); Mack Oil
Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955, 960 (Okla. 1964); Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396, 398
(Okla. 1960); Wolf v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 77 Okla. 81, 82, 186 P. 484, 484 (1920).
67. See Panhandle Coop. Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108, 113 (Okla. 1971) ("oil,
gas and other minerals" did not grant copper, silver, gold, or any other types of metallic ores or
metallic minerals); Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla. 1960) ("oil, gas and other
minerals" did not include gypsum rock); Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 68, 141 P.2d 276, 280 (1943)
("oil, petroleum, gas, coal, asphalt and all other minerals of every kind" did not include water);
Wolf v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 77 Okla. 81, 82, 186 P. 484, 484 (1920) ("oil or other minerals"
did not include gas); R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 1.1, at 4 (1971); 1 E. KUNTZ,
supra note 18, § 13.3, at 304.
9
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the enumerated minerals."68 The Oklahoma decision of Vogel v.
Cobb69 is often cited to demonstrate the application of the eusdem
generis doctrine.70 In Vogel, it was argued that water is a mineral and
thus would be included in the term "other minerals."'" One convey-
ance in Vogel granted "'oil, petroleum, gas, coal, asphalt and all other
minerals of every kind or character in and under and that may be pro-
duced from'" the land.72 A second conveyance granted "'oil, gas and
other minerals in and under and that may be produced from'" the
land.73 The Vogel court reasoned that "[w]hile it may be conceded that
water, in a technical sense, is a mineral, it does not follow that it will
pass under ordinary mineral deeds such as those here involved."74 Al-
though Vogel did not distinguish between salt water and fresh or do-
mestic water, the opinion seems to indicate that under ejusdem generis,
water in general is of a different class than oil and gas and, therefore,
would remain with the surface estate unless specifically conveyed.75
In Eke 1, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited Vogel for the rule
that fresh or domestic water belongs to the surface owner under the
ejusdem generis theory.76 However, Eike I distinguished fresh water
from salt water, suggesting that brine is more appropriately grouped
with oil and gas.77 Using the theory of ejusdem generis, the court stated
that "oil, gas and brine are produced through the identical borehole
and even share a common heritage. '7 8  This reasoning has been criti-
68. 1 E. KUNTZ, supra note 18, § 13.3, at 304.
69. 193 Okla. 64, 141 P.2d 276 (1943).
70. See Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955, 958-59 (Okla. 1964); Crorkhite v. Falken-
stein, 352 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla. 1960); Holt v. Southwest Antioch Sand Unit, Fifth Enlarged, 292
P.2d 998, 999 (Okla. 1956); see also 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 219.6, at
290 n.4 (1980) (summary and explanation of the Vogel decision).
71. 193 Okla. at 67, 141 P.2d at 280.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. After applying the rule of ejusdem generis, the court determined that the specifically
named minerals were of a species or class which did not include water.
The former are valuable minerals of a somewhat similar chemical composition, existing
in limited amounts, which are ordinarily extracted from the earth and sold for profit, but
which serve no useful function in connection with the use and enjoyment of the surface.
Water, on the other hand, is of quite a different chemical composition, is not ordinarily
thought of as valuable, but is necessary to life and the use and enjoyment of the surface.
Id.
75. Id.
76. Eike I, supra note 4, at 2687 & 2690 n.3.
77. Id. at 2687-88.
78. Id. at 2688. Uncontradicted testimony by Amoco scientists indicated that the iodine in
the brine was formed when algae died, in approximately the same geological time period that oil
and gas were formed. Id. The Eike I court appears to suggest that if the method of extraction is
19831
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cized as tenuous at best.79  "Ejusdem generls literally means 'of the
same kind or species.' The fact that brine water is often found in asso-
ciation with oil and gas does not necessarily make it 'of the same kind
or species.' "80
The Eike II court acknowledged the "common heritage" of iodine
and oil and gas, but did not deem that to be conclusive proof that io-
dine is part of the mineral estate."' However, the court did not explain
its decision that brine and iodine are part of the surface estate.8 2 Nev-
ertheless, it seems likely that the court did consider the doctrine of ejus-
dem generis in reaching its decision. One of Amoco's briefs traced the
history of Oklahoma's consistent use of the doctrine to limit convey-
ances of "oil, gas and other minerals."8 3 Amoco argued that under the
rules of stare decisis, the Court had to apply ejusdem gener/s and, if
applied to the facts in this case, the holding in Eike I could not stand.8 4
If Oklahoma intends to use this doctrine, specific guidelines are
needed for determining which substances are of the same class. To
achieve consistency under this theory it may be necessary to strictly
adhere to limitations based on the chemical composition of a
substance.
The court in Eike I also relied on Kuntz' "manner of enjoyment"
theory for assistance in solving the problem of construction.8, This the-
the same or if the substances were formed in the same geological time period, they are of the same
kind or class, regardless of chemical composition.
79. Lowe, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N 117, 126-28 (1981).
80. Id. at 127-28. Justice Hargrave's dissent in Eike I re-emphasized this, stating that in the
context of oil and gas conveyancing, brine is not part of the mineral estate under ejusdem generis
because it is not the same kind or species as oil and gas. Eike I, supra note 4, at 2691 (Hargrave,
J., dissenting).
81. Eike I1, supra note 5, exhibit A, at 4.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Brief of Appellees at 2-17, Eike II, supra note 5.
84. Id. at 12.
85. Eike I, supra note 4, at 2687-88. Based on the manner of enjoyment theory and the
doctrine of ejusdem generis, the Eike I court held that "brine water and its components is a min-
eral within the phrase, '. . . . oil, gas and other minerals,' and as such belongs to the mineral
estate owner, not the surface estate owner." Id. at 2688. However, Kuntz' manner of enjoyment
theory deals with an instrument where "a general grant or reservation is made of all minerals
without qualifying language." 1 E. KUNTZ, supra note 18, § 13.3, at 305 (emphasis added). This
does not provide clear guidelines when the words of conveyance or reservation do not include "all
minerals." Because minerals can be severed piecemeal from the mineral estate, it is necessary to
examine the original instrument to determine if the language indicated an intention to exclude or
to include a particular substance such as brine water. The intention is to be determined through
examination of the entire instrument, since other provisions may provide insight as to scope of the
intention. Id. at 305-06. The Eike I decision expanded the manner of enjoyment theory to cover
grants or reservations of "oil, gas and other minerals." See Eike I, supra note 4, at 2688. How-
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ory suggests that while the parties may have had no specific intention
concerning the disputed substance, they generally did intend that the
grantee would have whatever rights are necessary to enjoy the estate
created.86 Applying this theory in Eike I, the court said:
[F]resh water should belong to the surface estate owner be-
cause fresh water is necessary for the enjoyment of the surface
estate, while salt water, serving practically no useful purpose
to the surface owner as it is unfit for consumption by man and
beast and unfit for irrigation, should belong to the mineral
estate.
87
The Eike I decision seemed to be based on the logical conclusion of
this theory, that brine is not ordinarily useful to the surface estate and,
therefore, the parties to a mineral deed must have intended brine to be
part of the mineral estate. On the other hand, since fresh water is nec-
essary and useful to the surface estate, the parties must have intended
to include it in that estate.
This broad generalization does not take into account the agricul-
tural utility of treated or diluted brine.88 As technological advances are
made, brine may become as useful as fresh water to the surface estate.
If this occurs, the manner of enjoyment test would be of no use as an
ever, if the mineral estate was severed from the surface estate in a conveyance granting other than
"all minerals" or "oil, gas and other minerals," the original grantor may be deemed to have re-
tained the brine rights.
86. 1 E. KUNTZ, supra note 18, § 13.3, at 305. Professor Kuntz explained:
When a general grant or reservation is made of all minerals without qualifying language,
it should be apparent that the parties intended to sever the entire mineral estate from the
surface estate, leaving the respective owners of each estate with an estate which is enjoy-
able in a special manner. The manner of enjoyment of the mineral estate is through
extraction and removal of substances from the earth, whereas the enjoyment of the sur-
face is through retention of such substances as are necessary for the use of the surface,
and these respective modes of enjoyment should be taken into account in arriving at the
proper subject matter of each estate.
Id. Some courts use modified versions of the manner of enjoyment test proposed by Kuntz. In
1971, Texas used the "surface destruction test" in Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex.
1971). This test provides that if recovery of the substance in question would substantially destroy
the surface estate, then, unless a contrary intention is affirmatively expressed, the substance would
belong to the surface estate. Id. This test has been criticized, however, because it creates difficulty
in ascertaining mineral ownership from the face of the instrument. See Comment, supra note 42,
at 511-12 (analysis of the surface destruction test). Although Texas courts continue to use the
surface destruction test, Oklahoma courts have instead relied on ejusdem generis as a means of
limiting the mineral estate.
87. Eike I, supra note 4, at 2687-88.
88. See Hudson, supra note 3, at 450. Water containing a substantial amount of salt may
have agricultural value if diluted. Hudson referred to an informal amicus curiae brief in Robert-
son v. Blackwell Zinc Co., 390 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1965), to illustrate that when salty well water was
mixed with river water, the resulting water was safe for crops. Id. at 450 n.12.
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aid to construction when brine is the disputed substance, since brine
would then be useful to both the surface and the mineral estates.
In a separate opinion, Justice Irwin stated in Eike I that when
brine water is used for its water characteristics, it should belong to the
surface estate.8 9 This proposition would solve the problem of salt water
ownership when it can be beneficially used by the surface estate owner,
but does not necessarily answer the question of whether he can sell the
salt water. Nonetheless, it could be argued that anything that can be
sold is "useful" to the surface estate owner and, therefore, should be-
long to the surface estate.
Although Eike I should have clarified the questions of brine own-
ership, instead it confused Oklahoma's application of the theory of ejus-
dem generis and the manner of enjoyment test.90 Nor did Eike II clear
up the confusion. The Eike 11 court issued a memorandum opinion
merely affirming the judgment of the trial court.91 Without an explana-
tion, one can only speculate as to the reasoning behind the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's decision to withdraw Eike I after two years.
C. Ancillary Issues of Eike I & II
The Eike controversy concerned a situation in which brine was
considered valuable. However, brine is often acquired not intention-
ally, but as a by-product of oil and gas operations. Because brine has
historically been considered waste, leasehold operators have given it
away or even paid to have it hauled away. Since Eike II determined
that brine is owned by the surface owner, a leasehold operator is faced
with the dilemma of what to do with waste brine. If he gives it away,
he could be liable to the surface owners for the value of the brine or the
extractable minerals.92 An interested buyer will have to obtain a lease
89. Eike I, supra note 4, at 2691 (Irwin, V.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. As technological advances are made, substances previously not useful to the surface es-
tate may become of use or value to the surface estate. It is crucial that the mineral owner know
how these advances will be treated under the manner of enjoyment theory, whether surface use of
the substance will entail a loss of ownership rights by the mineral estate owner and, if it does,
whether the loss will apply retroactively.
91. Eike II, supra note 5, at 2.
92. The Eike I court raised an additional issue by indicating that "[alll parties are to share in
gas and brine royalties in proportion of their acreage. ... Eke 1, supra note 4, at 2689. The
idea of brine royalties is a new one. In the past, the right to use brine was given by a lease
charging a yearly rental for the right to extract brine. In many cases, oil or gas well operators paid
to have waste brine hauled away. The Eike I court declared brine to be a mineral, however, and
many leases contain royalty provisions that not only cover oil and gas, but "other minerals" as
well. Problems can arise in determining whether and how royalties should be paid on unrefined
brine, because in that state it may not have value. Mineral owners would receive nothing if their
[Vol. 18:698
13
Grissom: Brine Recovery: Has Eike v. Amoco Ended the Confusion in Oklahoma
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982
19831 BRINE RECOVERY
from the surface owner. And yet, the brine may be so worthless that no
one will buy it. If he relies on Eike II, the mineral owner or operator
may have to drill injection wells to return the brine to the formation or
negotiate with the surface owner as to disposal.
Eike II has an impact on other methods of brine recovery, such as
the re-entry of abandoned oil and gas wells to obtain salt water produc-
tion. A potential producer must determine ownership of the aban-
doned borehole as well as of the brine itself. There is authority that an
abandoned borehole is owned by the surface owner.9 3  Therefore,
under Eike I, a party wishing to obtain brine in this manner would
have been required to obtain leases from both the mineral and surface
owners. However, Eike II indicates that brine is part of the surface
estate, thus a producer need only obtain a lease from the surface owner.
An additional problem was created by the manner in which the
court withdrew Eike I and affirmed the trial court's opinion. If a party
had relied upon Eike I and obtained brine leases from mineral owners,
an overruling of the decision would leave the rights of the parties un-
changed.94 However, when an opinion is withdrawn as opposed to be-
ing overruled, the earlier opinion is treated as if it had never been
issued.9" Therefore, any party acquiring brine under only a mineral
royalties were paid on worthless unprocessed brine. The language of the royalty clause may be
tailored to specify the point at which the brine will be valued for the purpose of computing royal-
ties. See 3 E. KUNTZ, supra note 18, § 41.2, at 336.
An analogous situation occurred in Haynes v. Eagle-Picher Co., 295 F.2d 761 (10th Cir.
1961), where mining operations brought crude oil to the surface and extracted zinc and lead con-
centrates which were further refined to produce zinc, sulphur, lead, cadmium and germanium.
Under the terms of the lease, the court determined that royalties were to be paid on all minerals
produced and sold. Id. at 764. The court noted that although these minerals may not have had
value at the place extracted, they had a definite value at the place "produced" after mining and
removal. Id. Royalty payments are based on market value and "[i]t is common knowledge that
minerals are not separated from the earth in pure form and that, except in rare instances, some
processing is necessary to render them marketable." Id. When minerals are processed and ac-
quire an ascertainable value, they are covered by the terms of the royalty provisions for "other
minerals." Thus, royalties will have to be paid on the sale or disposal of brine, based on the value
of any extractable minerals in solution. Therefore, under Eike I, an operator disposing of the
waste brine from a sludge pit would have been liable for royalty payments due the mineral owner.
However, since ike II determined that brine water is owned by the surface owner, an operator
disposing of waste brine may be liable to the surface owner for damages caused by conversion.
The royalty issue only arises when brine water is considered a mineral owned by the mineral
estate.
93. Gutierrez v. Davis, 618 F.2d 700, 702 (10th Cir. 1980) ("Under Oklahoma law, when the
casing is not removed by the lessee within a reasonable time, it becomes property of the land-
owner." (citation omitted)); Sunray Oil Co. v. Cortez Oil Co., 188 Okla. 690, 694, 112 P.2d 792,
795 (1941) ("[T]he owner of the land, subject only to the oil and gas lease . . . has the right to so
use the surface and substrata of her land as she sees fit, or permit others so to do. ... ).
94. See State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Keller, 264 P.2d 742, 750 (Okla. 1953).
95. Collins v. Wanner, 382 P.2d 105, 108 (Okla. 1963).
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lease, in reliance upon Eike I, will be liable to the surface owners for
the value of the brine. An argument may be made that because a peti-
tion for rehearing had been filed, any party interested in brine produc-
tion should have protected himself from liability by obtaining brine
leases from both the mineral owner and the surface owner. The ques-
tion then becomes, how long is it practical to maintain both leases? It
took the Oklahoma Supreme Court nearly two years to grant a rehear-
ing. It would have been more equitable to overrule Eke -- consider-
ing the length of time between opinions-than to pretend Eike I never
existed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The above discussion presents an indication of the confusion sur-
rounding the brine ownership issue. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
could have addressed this matter in greater detail and provided clear
guidelines to follow in the production of brine. The summary manner
in which the court dealt with Eike v. Amoco Production Co. clearly does
not foreclose the probability of future judicial determinations of own-
ership of brine and the minerals derived therefrom. The importance of
salt water now and in the future warrants a stable, legal foundation
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